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Europe’s	COVID-19	response	must	be	delivered	by
society	at	large,	not	just	governments
So	far,	the	focus	has	been	on	the	EU’s	institutional	responses	to	the	COVID-19	crisis.	Drawing	on	the	Visions	of
Europe	project,	Roch	Dunin-Wąsowicz	(LSE)	explains	why	we	need	to	pay	attention	to	how	civil	society	can
survive	the	pandemic	and	help	shape	the	response	to	it.
In	Slovakia,	civil	society	organisations	such	as	Mareena	and	the	Human	Rights	League	have	been	guiding	migrants
and	refugees	on	the	country’s	response	to	COVID-19	and	on	how	to	get	by,	but	have	also	engaged	them	into
community	response	by	sewing	facemasks	for	other	vulnerable	groups.	German	hospitals	in	Baden-Wuerttemberg
have	responded	to	the	call	of	doctors	Alsace’s	Mulhouse	and	Colmar	that	could	not	cope	with	the	volume	of
patients	and	opened	their	doors	to	them.	In	Portugal,	the	Odemira	municipality	in	Alentejo	prepared	special
quarantine	spaces	for	the	region’s	foreign	agricultural	workers,	regardless	of	legal	status.	Border	communities
across	the	Polish,	German,	and	Czech	borders	campaigned	ferociously	against	the	national	lockdown	restrictions
that	deprived	transnational	workers	of	their	livelihood.
In	recent	weeks,	calls	from	society	for	different	modalities	of	a	universal	income	have	gained	traction,	some	more
radical,	than	others.	A	consortium	of	formalised	civil	society	actors,	led	by	Europe’s	trade	unions,	have	called	for
more	European	solidarity,	especially	with	front-line	staff	in	the	health	service,	and	all	those	who	are	socially
vulnerable	or	precariously	employed.	While	civil	society	groups	have	been	mobilising	around	the	world	to	deal	with
the	effects	of	the	crisis,	it	is	in	Europe	where	new	types	of	social	mobilisation	were	most	able	to	act	both	within	and
across	states.	European	citizens	have	been	showing	cross-border	solidarity	in	response	to	the	pandemic	when
institutions	were	lacking,	including	local	and	informal	civic	activism.
These	and	many	other	reactions	to	COVID-19	do	not	fit	neatly	into	national	institutional	frames.	They	underscore
how	European	integration	has	moved	forward	since	its	inception.	They	also	illuminate	the	shortcomings	of	the
current	European	construction.	While	the	link	between	civil	society	and	COVID-19	isn’t,	of	course,	unique	to
Europe,	the	data	gathered	through	the	Visions	of	Europe	project	point	to	the	role	both	national	and	European	civil
society	might	play	in	the	response	to	the	COVID-19	pandemic,	and	how	it	can	be	harnessed	to	achieve	effective
recovery.	History	teaches	us	that	civil	society	is	part	of	the	critical	infrastructure	of	democracy,	and	thereby	an
indispensable	tool	to	counter	social	ills,	such	as	pandemics,	in	free	societies.	Nowhere	has	this	been	as	clear	as	in
Europe,	within	and	across	states.
While	the	COVID-19	pandemic	is	a	humanitarian	crisis,	disproportionately	hitting	the	elderly	and	the	weakest	in
society,	its	lasting	effects	on	the	economy,	politics,	and	society	might	be	equally	dire.	The	question	of	civil	society’s
response	is	particularly	pertinent	considering	the	accumulation	of	executive	power	by	governments.	Civil	society	will
be	of	crucial	importance	to	keep	track	on	the	restrictions	put	on	civil	liberties,	to	ensure	they	have	been
implemented	within	a	liberal	democratic	framework	and	that	authorities	do	not	resort	to	(neo-)authoritarian
measures.	And	while	COVID-19	has	deprived	civil	society	of	the	immediate	sociability	that	catalyses	action	–
country-wide	curbs	on	gatherings	put	in	place	throughout	Europe	since	March	2020	have	effectively	paralysed
social	life	in	its	physical	form	–	online	communication	seems	to	have	supplanted	most	traditional	forms	of	sociality	in
a	matter	of	days,	accelerating	a	familiar	dynamic.
Many	of	the	examples	of	new	civic	activity	in	Europe	transgress	national	boundaries,	but	they	also	go	beyond	the
traditional	distinction	between	the	state,	the	economy,	and	organised	civil	society.	A	great	deal	of	the	upsurge	of
social	mobilisation	in	the	face	of	COVID-19	doesn’t	fit	these	established	categories,	especially	in	a	plural	political
and	social	space	such	as	today’s	Europe.
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Nationalisation	of	responses
The	first	and	most	striking	development	resulting	from	the	COVID-19	emergency	was	the	nationalisation	of
responses	to	its	spread,	both	structural	and	ideational.	On	the	structural	level,	this	should	come	as	no	surprise.
Apart	from	the	work	done	by	the	European	Medicines	Agency,	transnational	health	care	provisions,	and	some	joint
procurement	of	medical	equipment,	health	policy	remains	the	sole	domain	of	EU	Member	States.	Equally,	the
Schengen	Zone	–	the	temporary	suspension	of	border	check	between	countries	–	is	an	arrangement	from	which
each	state	has	the	right	to	opt	out.	So	it	is	unsurprising	that,	initially,	the	Member	States	took	upon	themselves	to
prioritise	the	availability	of	medical	equipment	for	their	own	health	services.	In	early	March	2020,	France	and
Germany	imposed	limits	on	the	sale	of	PPE	to	other	countries.	And	while	these	moves	have	been	dubbed	as
selfish,	they	highlight	the	long-standing	but	sometimes	hidden	or	overlooked	interests	and	tensions	that	exist	within
the	EU.
Equally,	starting	with	Austria,	Latvia,	Poland,	and	Slovakia	temporary	reintroduction	of	border	control	within
Schengen	took	around	the	same	time,	without	much	prior	consultation	on	the	EU	level,	which	put	a	spanner	in	the
workings	of	the	Single	Market.	Poland’s	border	restrictions	continue	to	be	a	source	of	friction	for	the	movement	of
goods,	services,	and	people,	especially	with	Czechia	and	Germany.	Conversely,	Portugal	enfranchised	all	of	its
irregular	migrants,	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	who	had	made	themselves	known	to	the	authorities,	by	giving
them	access	to	social	security	during	the	pandemic.	While	commendable,	this	measure	has	been	restricted	to	that
country,	leaving	millions	of	migrants	elsewhere	in	the	EU	in	the	lurch.
The	second	dimension	of	nationalisation	was	the	“rapid	shrinking	of	horizons”	of	the	citizenry	of	Europe’s	states
when	faced	with	an	unprecedented	emergency.	This	nationalist	reflex,	however,	has	been	largely	constructed	by
politicians	hoping	to	benefit	from	such	framing	in	pursuit	of	narrow	political	goals.	Yet	one	cannot	help	but
empathise	with	the	plight	of	Italy	in	the	initial	stages	of	the	pandemic,	when	it	got	almost	no	support	from	other
European	states	in	time	of	dire	need.	This	experience	has	been	politicised	and	translated	into	record	low
satisfaction	with	European	integration.	In	early	March	2020,	88%	of	Italians	thought	Europe	had	failed	to	adequately
help	their	country.
Nationalist	narratives	can	find	fertile	ground	in	crisis-stricken	Member	States.	And	while	some	crisis	mitigation
measures	can	only	be	delivered	by	the	state	–	or	even	on	the	local	level	–	in	other	respects	the	response	to	COVID-
19	necessitates	multilateral,	or	in	the	case	of	Europe	supranational,	solutions.	Yet	dispute	these	measures,	the
nationalist	narrative	has	been	greatly	reinforced	by	COVID-19.	It	also	has	been	matched	by	a	profoundly	state-
centric	focus	of	expert	analysis	that	places	society	–	including	civil	society	–	as	a	mere	recipient	of	measures	put	in
by	respective	governments.
Europe’s	response
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In	an	interesting	turn	of	events,	both	long-term	critics	and	supporters	of	European	supra-nationalism	have
castigated	the	EU	for	“not	doing	enough”	or	“miserably	failing”	in	its	response	to	the	pandemic.	On	the	one	hand,
this	preoccupation	with	the	EU	shows	how	the	European	frame	of	reference	is	now	embedded	in	the	political
imagination	of	the	European	demos.	On	the	other,	this	kind	of	scapegoating	of	the	EU	for	seeming	failings,	in
domains	in	which	it	has	little	or	no	jurisdiction,	is	nothing	new.	The	European	Commission	has,	in	fact,	after	an	initial
period	of	wavering,	undertaken	most	of	the	measures	at	its	disposal:	it	safeguarded	Europe’s	supply	chains	despite
border	closures;	EU	state	aid	and	fiscal	rules	have	been	relaxed	to	allow	for	unique	levels	of	spending	by	the
Member	States	to	prop	up	their	economies;	the	Commission	is	raising	€100bn	to	tackle	upcoming	joblessness;	it
has	unrolled	two	coronavirus	investment	initiatives	(CRII	&	CRII+).	As	of	late	May,	the	Commission	recommended
an	additional	financial	stimulus	of	€1.85	tn,	including	(but	not	limited	to)	€540bn	in	loans	agreed	by	the	eurozone	in
April,	as	well	as	€500bn	of	grants	through	the	Next	Generation	EU	initiative	and	another	€250(BN?)	in	loans	–
delivered	via	the	MFF.
Importantly,	the	rhetoric	of	the	EU’s	seeming	inaction	was	derived	from	a	supremely	institutional	understanding	of
its	functioning.	Yet	it	has	been	civil	society	actors	that	have	urged	more	European	coordination.	A	multitude	of
grassroots	petitions	and	initiatives,	coordinated	by	academics,	industry	bodies	and	trade	unions,	have	all	been
calling	for	“Europe	to	do	more	together”	from	the	very	beginning	of	the	pandemic.
The	threat	of	emergency	politics	to	democracy
Perhaps	the	most	worrying	development	of	the	COVID-19	crisis	is	the	rollback	of	substantive	democracy,
democratic	backsliding,	or	outright	authoritarian	measures	that	have	become	part	of	the	emergency	responses.	In
Britain,	the	government’s	extraordinary	curbs	on	civil	liberties	had	initially	no	sunset	clause,	and	subsequently,
Parliament	was	disbanded	for	an	early	Easter	recess	preventing	adequate	scrutiny.	In	Poland,	the	ruling	Law	and
Justice	party	unsuccessfully	pressed	for	the	10	May	presidential	elections	to	take	place	–	hoping	for	an	easy	win	in
the	initial	phase	of	the	crisis	–	despite	a	country-wide	lockdown.	Most	infamously,	the	Hungarian	parliament	has
allowed	Victor	Orbán	to	rule	by	decree	without	any	restrictions.	He	has	already	used	these	powers	to	enact	laws
that	have	nothing	to	do	with	the	pandemic	(gender	identity)	and	to	encroach	on	local	authorities’	jurisdiction	and
arrest	critics	of	the	government	for	social	media	activity.
All	these	threats	to	democracy	are	putting	a	strain	on	civic	activity,	which	finds	itself	in	an	unprecedented
predicament,	both	in	terms	of	the	types	of	threats	it	faces	and	the	responses	at	its	disposal.	While	both	the
European	Commission	and	the	European	Parliament	have	expressed	concerns	regarding	these	troubling
developments,	it	is	action	that	is	needed.	The	threat	posed	by	emergency	politics	to	democracy	can	only	be
stemmed	by	supporting	civil	society.	In	some	instances,	civic	mobilisation	has	an	ally	in	local	government,
especially	when	activists	from	the	third	sector	join	public	administration	given	the	opportunity.	For	example,	
Budapest’s	Mayor,	Gergely	Karácsony,	has	called	for	more	EU	funding	to	be	directly	channelled	to	towns	and	cities,
and	NGOs	to	circumvent	the	politicised	central	government.	This	is	especially	pertinent,	as	some	of	the	initial
emergency	CRII	funding	went	directly	to	Member	State	governments.	The	current	regime	in	Budapest	actually
received	a	disproportionately	large	share	of	it.	Right	now,	the	EU’s	attention	is	preoccupied	with	crisis	containment
and	recovery	planning,	and	its	ability	to	police	rule	of	law	infringements	has	always	been	limited.	European
solidarity	cannot	be	implemented	at	the	expense	of	democracy.	If	Member	States	are	the	culprits,	for	example
waging	culture	wars	optimised	for	the	pandemic	to	detract	attention	from	their	failings,	the	only	viable	solution	is	to
strengthen	grassroots	politics	and	advocacy	groups.
Mainstreaming	of	marginal	ideas
One	of	the	modest	silver	linings	of	the	COVID-19	crisis	is	the	restoration	of	fact-based	policymaking.	Scientists,
predominately	epidemiologists,	but	also	sociologists	and	experts	in	public	choice	theory,	are	back	in	vogue	–	or	so	it
seems.	Civil	society	institutions	have	long	been	a	repository	of	expert	knowledge.	In	recent	years	many	of	them
have	been	cast	aside	by	populist	politicians	pandering	to	disenchanted	publics.	The	COVID-19	crisis	has	the
potential	to	restore	their	voices	to	the	public	debate.	For	example,	in	Italy,	the	decline	of	support	for	populist	parties
has	accelerated.	Europe’s	right-wing	populists,	in	general,	have	been	on	the	decline	throughout	this	emergency.	In
more	general	terms,	the	pandemic	has	accelerated	the	mainstreaming	of	once	marginal	ideas,	many	of	which
originated	in	civil	society.	Today,	a	remarkable	84%	of	Europeans	support	an	EU	proposal	for	a	mandatory
minimum	wage,	a	suggestion	long	on	the	agenda	of	workers’	rights	advocates	in	Europe.	The	fact	that	radical	anti-
austerity	measures	are	now	advocated	by	newspapers	like	the	FT,	with	many	western	governments	heeding	this
advice,	proves	that	once	seemingly	utopian	ideas	can	become	policy	come	the	right	circumstance.
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Another	example	of	this	is	the	unprecedented	fall	in	economic	activity,	which	means	that	pollution	has	decreased
rapidly,	giving	a	glimpse	of	how	to	stem	the	climate	emergency.	In	the	UK	alone	car	traffic	went	down	by	almost
three-quarters	and	reached	levels	last	observed	65	years	ago.	This	hiatus	in	the	rapid	development	of	the	climate
emergency	has	coincided	with	the	mainstreaming	of	environmental	sustainability,	thanks	to	pressure	exerted	by
experts	and	civil	society	actors	in	recent	years.	The	adoption	of	CO2	emission	reduction	targets	and	the	embracing
of	a	“European	Green	New	Deal”	by	the	new	European	Commission	wouldn’t	have	been	possible	without
grassroots	activism.	Recently,	the	Extinction	Rebellion	and	Climate	Strike	actions	have	had	a	notable	impact	of	the
public	consciousness	with	regard	to	the	climate	emergency,	but	this	advocacy	has	been	carried	out	by	ecological
experts	and	campaigners	for	decades	now.	The	COVID-19	crisis	brings	Europe	a	step	closer	to	realising	what
impact	unscrupulous	economic	growth	has	had	on	the	environment.	Civil	society	will	have	a	pivotal	role	in	ensuring
that	post-COVID-19	recovery	follows	the	path	of	green	transition,	while	safeguarding	the	interests	of	groups	that	will
bear	the	brunt	of	the	economic	and	social	turmoil.
Visions	of	Europe
These	developments	are	consistent	with	our	findings	from	the	Visions	of	Europe	project,		which	maps	transnational
civil	society	in	Europe.	Civil	society	institutions,	movements,	movement-parties	and	other	non-institutional	forms	of
social	mobilisation	often	equate	Europe	with	the	notion	of	solidarity.	The	progressive	groups	we	spoke	to	object	to	a
transactional	approach	to	European	integration,	which	sees	it	merely	as	a	resource,	a	playground	for	inter-
governmental	bargaining,	and	a	scapegoat	for	failing	national	administrations.	That	approach	could	not	withstand
the	economic	and	the	existential	shocks	of	2008	and	2015,	let	alone	the	current	one.	Today,	too,	reverting	to
national	solutions	will	only	feed	regressive	political	forces	that	had	been	capitalising	on	Europe-wide	crises	in	the
past.
In	times	of	a	global	pandemic,	political	leaders	need	to	heed	civil	society	and	see	it,	once	again,	as	a	source	of
values	and	policy	solutions.	Many	of	our	interlocutors	speak	of	finding	“European	solutions	to	European	problems,”
which	is	the	language	often	used	by	Brussels.	Yet	what	they	are	advocating	for	is	bottom-up	policy-making	and
implementation.	Their	aim	is	greater	inclusion	of	various	perspectives	from	society	and	the	greatest	degree	of
subsidiarity	–	decisions	should	be	made	and	implemented	as	close	to	the	citizen	as	possible.	One	needs	to
coordinate	on	a	European	level,	but	local	actors	should	have	maximum	agency	in	adjusting	policy	and
implementing	change	on	the	ground.
Europe’s	activist	civil	society	may	have	embraced	many	of	the	achievements	of	the	EU	–	such	as	a	focus	on
equality	before	the	law,	and	the	European	Social	Model	–	they	do	however	insist	that	there	are	grave	lesson	to	be
learned	from	the	failures	of	the	EU	in	recent	years.	Still,	many	had	already	seen	the	crisis	of	democracy	as	an
opportunity	to	reignite	political	engagement	before	the	pandemic	erupted.	Today,	the	conditions	for	civil	society	to
push	for	solidarity	below	and	across	the	nation-states	seem	to	be	ripe.	If	it	is	to	be	successful,	Europe’s	response	to
COVID-19	has	to	be	delivered	by	society	at	large.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog	or	LSE.	Image	by	Mircea
Iancu	from	Pixabay.
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